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Abstract— We consider an online assortment problem with
[n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} sellers, each holding exactly one item i ∈ [n]
with initial inventory ci ∈ Z+, and a sequence of homogeneous
buyers arriving over a finite time horizon t = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
There is an online platform whose goal is to offer a subset
St ⊆ [n] of sellers to the arriving buyer at time t to maximize
the expected revenue derived over the entire horizon while
respecting the inventory constraints. Given an assortment St
at time t, it is assumed that the buyer will select an item
from St based on the well-known multinomial logit model,
a well-justified choice model from the economic literature.
In this model, the revenue obtained from selling an item i
at a given time t critically depends on the assortment St
offered at that time and is given by the Nash equilibrium of a
Bertrand game among the sellers in St. This imposes a strong
dependence/externality among the offered assortments, items
revenues, and inventory levels. Despite that challenge, we devise
a constant competitive algorithm for the online assortment
problem with homogeneous buyers. It answers a question in
[1] that considered the static version of the assortment problem
with only one buyer and no inventory constraints. We also show
that the online assortment problem with heterogeneous buyers
does not admit a constant competitive algorithm. To compensate
that issue, we then consider the assortment problem under an
offline setting with heterogeneous buyers. Under a mild market
consistency assumption, we show that the generalized Bertrand
game admits a pure Nash equilibrium over general buyer-seller
bipartite graphs. Finally, we develop an O(lnm)-approximation
algorithm for optimal market segmentation of the generalized
Bertrand game which allows the platform to derive higher
revenues by partitioning the market into smaller pools.
Index Terms— Online assortment; revenue management; in-
ventory management; pure Nash equilibrium; Bertrand game;
multinomial logit model; optimal market segmentation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the rapid growth of the Internet and online
markets such as Amazon, eBay, Airbnb, and Uber, the
influence of online platforms on our daily decision-making
is inevitable. In addition, online platforms play a major role
in revenue management and supply-demand based on their
pricing mechanisms. For instance, when a customer searches
for a specific product (e.g., a TV) in an online marketplace
(e.g., Amazon.com), the platform decides on what list of
products to display to the customer. Similarly, when one
is booking a room through Hotels.com or Orbitz.com, the
online platform offers a list of available rooms at different
hotels based on the searched data. As a result, depending
on what list of items is offered, the online platform derives
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science
Foundation (CAREER) under Grant No. EPCN-1944403.
different revenues from potential buyers while meeting their
demands using available items. In fact, based on a global
survey [2], the total market value of online platforms is
growing rapidly and now exceeds a net value of 4.3 trillion
U.S. dollars worldwide.
In general, one can identify two types of online platforms
in terms of their operation flexibility [3]. The first, known
as the full control model, allows the platform to have full
control over offered assortments, prices, and the underlying
supply-demand matching algorithms. As an example of the
full control model, consider Uber, which not only offers
rides to passengers, but also sets prices based on a revenue-
maximizing optimization algorithm. However, unlike tradi-
tional firms, most online platforms do not dictate specific
transaction prices. Instead, the platforms only create a trading
environment and let the prices and revenues be determined
organically as a result of interactions between buyers and
sellers. This brings us to the discriminatory control model,
in which the platform sets the stage (e.g., decides what
items to display), and the prices or potential matches are
determined endogenously based on sellers’/buyers’ choices.
For instance, Airbnb only displays a list of available rooms
to the customers; the rental prices are determined by compe-
tition among the property owners. As another example, eBay
determines what products to display, and the prices/revenues
are determined based on customers’ demands and the com-
petition among retailers.
Motivated by a variety of such examples, in this paper, we
analyze a discriminatory control model for the marketplace
problem under both online and offline settings. In the online
setting, we consider a model in which each seller owns an
indivisible item with a known quality and private inventory.
As each item is owned by exactly one seller, we often refer
to “items” and “sellers” interchangeably. There is a platform
that can decide on what set of sellers to display to each
upcoming homogeneous buyer. That induces a competition
among the displayed sellers to set their items’ prices, where
the optimal prices are given by the Nash equilibrium of the
Bertrand game induced by the set of displayed sellers.1 For
instance, the Bertrand game can model the situation in which
the hosts on Airbnb compete for potential guests by setting
prices for their properties. Given the equilibrium prices,
the guest either selects a room based on the multinomial
1As we shall see, sellers do not need to be intelligent enough to precisely
compute these equilibrium prices; simply best responding to others’ posted
prices will guarantee convergence to equilibrium prices.
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logit (MNL) model or decides to leave the market without
booking any room. Therefore, we are interested in devising
an efficiently computable online policy for the platform to
maximize the aggregate revenue of the sellers over the entire
horizon. In particular, we want our online algorithm to be
competitive with respect to the best in-hindsight policy that
knows the total number of buyers and the inventory levels a
priori.
Unfortunately, we will show that for heterogeneous buyers
with different evaluations of items’ qualities, there is no
constant-competitive online algorithm for the platform. To
address that issue, we also consider an offline marketplace
with heterogeneous buyers in which all the buyers are
available in the market, i.e., they do not joining sequentially.
As a result, the equilibrium prices of the sellers are now given
by a so-called generalized Bertrand game that is induced
by a two-sided market in which buyers and sellers are on
different sides. Here we are interested in the existence of a
pure Nash equilibrium in the generalized Bertrand game that
extends the existence result of [3] from the case of a single
buyer to the multi-buyer case over general bipartite graphs.
In particular, we consider the problem of optimal market
segmentation over the generalized Bertrand game, where the
goal is to segment the entire market into smaller pools such
that the aggregate revenue obtained at the equilibrium of
the submarkets improves on the revenue obtained at the
equilibrium of the original market. It is worth noting that
market segmentation is a practical approach for many online
platforms such as Uber in which the platform decides what
buyers and sellers are visible to each other so as to improve
the total derived revenue [4].
A. Related Work
The design of an online marketplace with different objec-
tives has been studied in the past literature [4]–[7]. However,
unlike prior work [4], [6] that uses monotone distribution
functions to capture supply and demand curves, we use the
well-known multinomial logit (MNL) model [8]–[10] to cap-
ture buyers’ choice behavior. That, in turn, allows us to de-
scribe buyers’ demands in terms of purchase probabilities for
substitutable items. Through use of such demand functions,
the competition among displayed sellers is captured using
the Bertrand game, which has been extensively studied in
the economic literature [11], [12] for modeling oligopolistic
competition in actual markets. Perhaps our work is most
related to [1] and [3], in which the static version of the
problem that we consider here was studied, i.e., when there
is only one buyer with no inventory constraints. It was shown
in [1] that the revenue function for a single-buyer, one-shot
market has a nice quasi-convex structure that allows one
to find the optimal assortment efficiently. In particular, the
authors raised the question of designing an optimal dynamic
mechanism whereby the buyers arrive and depart, and the
sellers have limited capacity for products. In this paper, we
answer that question by devising the first constant-factor
competitive algorithm that can be implemented efficiently
in real-time.
This work is also closely related to dynamic online assort-
ment [13]–[18] and dynamic revenue management [19]–[23],
whose goal, broadly speaking, is to dynamically choose as-
sortments/prices in order to maximize the aggregate revenue
obtained by selling items subject to inventory constraints.
Such problems have been extensively studied under various
settings, such as the stochastic demand arrival model [19],
[22], [23], the adversarial demand model in which the
sequence of buyers’ types can be chosen adversarially [13],
and reusable items, i.e., an allocated product can be returned
to the inventory after some random amount of time [16],
[17]. We refer to [24] for a comprehensive survey of recent
advances on dynamic pricing and inventory management
problems.
On the other hand, except for a handful of results [15],
[25], [26], the effect of competition or externalities in dy-
namic assortment problems has not been addressed before.
In fact, almost all the earlier results on dynamic online
assortment (see, e.g., [13], [14], [19]) consider fixed-revenue
items, meaning that the revenue obtained from selling an item
is fixed and does not depend on the offered assortments. That
makes linear programming (LP) methods quite amenable to
use in design of competitive online algorithms, and such LP
methods have been used in several earlier research efforts
[13], [17]. Unfortunately, the dependence of revenues on the
offered assortments creates extra externalities that make the
use of conventional methods, such as dual-fitting or dynamic
programming formulations, more complex. To handle such
externalities, in this work we take a different approach and
use a novel charging argument that allows us to compare the
revenue obtained from our online algorithm with that of the
optimal offline benchmark.
It is worth mentioning that our work is also related to
online learning for LPs with packing constraints [27]–[29].
The reason is that one can use an LP with packing constraints
to upper-bound the revenue of the optimal offline algorithm.
As a result, generating a feasible solution in an online fashion
to such an LP whose objective value is competitive with
the offline LP’s will automatically deliver a competitive
online algorithm for our problem. A typical approach is to
dynamically learn/estimate the dual variables of the offline
LP by using some black-box online learning algorithms
(e.g., the multiplicative weight update rule [29]) and use
the estimated dual variables to guide the primal solution
generated by the algorithm. However, the LP formulation
in our setting has exponentially many variables that are
associated with all the feasible assortments. Therefore, it is
not clear, without extra effort, how this approach can be used
to devise a polynomial-time competitive algorithm for our
online assortment problem.
Finally, the generalized Bertrand game that we consider in
this paper is an extension of the single-buyer Bertrand game
given in [3]. To the best of our knowledge, Bertrand games
over general bipartite graphs and MNL demands have not
been addressed in the past literature. Here we should men-
tion that other oligopolistic competitions, such as Cournot
competition over general bipartite graphs, have been studied
in [30], [31]. However, a major challenge in analyzing the
generalized Bertrand game compared to the network Cournot
game is the restriction of the players’ strategy spaces. More
precisely, in the network Cournot game, a player can control
its supply to each of its buyers, while in the generalized
Bertrand game, a player can only set one price, and the
demands are computed endogenously. Moreover, establishing
the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in network Cournot
games is typically done by reduction to potential games [32]
or submodular games [33], a property that does not seem to
hold in our generalized Bertrand game.
B. Contributions and Organization
In Section II, we formally define the online assortment
problem, which extends the existing literature from the
single-buyer static model to a dynamic setting with inventory
constraints. In Section III, we show that the online assortment
problem with heterogeneous buyers does not admit a constant
competitive algorithm. Subsequently, we restrict our attention
to the online assortment problem with identical buyers. We
then provide a linear programming upper bound for the
optimal revenue of any online algorithm and establish some
results on the substitutability of the revenue functions. In
Section IV, we devise a constant competitive algorithm for
the online assortment problem with homogeneous buyers.
The proposed algorithm is a hybrid deterministic algorithm
whose analysis is based on a novel charging argument. The
approach extends the existing results on online assortment
problems with fixed revenues to set-dependent revenue func-
tions. We also provide some numerical results to demonstrate
the efficiency of the proposed algorithm beyond its theoret-
ical guarantee.
Because of the nonexistence of competitive online algo-
rithms with heterogeneous buyers and in order to extend our
results to heterogeneous buyers, in Section V, we introduce
an offline generalized Bertrand game over general bipartite
graphs. In the generalized game, buyers can have different
evaluations of items’ qualities, and sellers have a limited
number of items. Despite the highly nonlinear structure of
the sellers’ payoff functions, we show that under a mild
market consistency assumption, the generalized Bertrand
game admits a pure Nash equilibrium. We also provide an
approximation algorithm for the optimal segmentation of the
generalized Bertrand game, which allows the offline platform
to derive higher revenues by partitioning the market into
smaller pools. We conclude the paper by identifying some
future directions of research in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce the online assortment prob-
lem. We will postpone the offline setting to Section V.
We consider an online assortment problem with [n] :=
{1, . . . , n} sellers, where the ith seller holds item i ∈ [n]
with an initial inventory ci ∈ Z+. Here ci is private
information that is known only to seller i and not to any
other seller or the platform. As noted earlier, as each item
is assigned to exactly one seller, throughout this paper we
use the terms sellers and items interchangeably. Each item
i ∈ [n] has a fixed quality θi ∈ R, and without loss of
generality, we assume that the items are sorted according
to their qualities, i.e., θ1 ≥ . . . ≥ θn. We also define
a “no-purchase” item {0} with θ0 = 0 to represent the
case in which a buyer decides to leave the market without
making a purchase. We should mention that unlike [3], which
only considers nonnegative qualities θi ∈ R+,∀i, we allow
negative qualities, i.e., θi ∈ R. Such an extension creates a
more realistic market model in which a negative-quality item
captures the case in which a buyer strongly prefers to leave
the market rather than purchase that item.
A. Sellers’ Equilibrium Prices, Demands, and Revenues
We consider a sequence of homogeneous buyers that
arrive at discrete time instances t = 1, 2, . . . ,m, for some
unknown integer m ∈ Z+. As in [3] and [7], we adopt
the random utility model for the purchase probability of
the buyers. In the random utility model, the buyer has a
private random preference ζi about the ith item. Given a
vector of nonnegative prices p¯ = (p¯1, . . . , p¯n) on the items,2
the buyer derives utility ui = ζi + θi − p¯i from purchasing
item i ∈ [n]. Therefore, the buyer purchases item i with the
highest utility, i.e., i = argmaxj∈[n]∪{0} uj , where ties are
broken arbitrarily. In particular, under the assumption that ζi
are i.i.d. random variables with a Gumbel distribution, we
obtain the well-known multinomial logit (MNL) purchase
probabilities [8]–[10]. Thus, for every i ∈ [n]∪{0} we have
q¯i(p¯) := P(i = argmax
j∈[n]∪{0}
uj) =
exp(θi − p¯i)∑
j∈[n]∪{0} exp(θj − p¯j)
.
(1)
The probability q¯i(p¯) can also be viewed as the expected
demand of a buyer for item i given posted prices p¯.
In this paper, we consider a discriminatory control model
wherein, upon the arrival of a buyer, the online platform can
decide on what subset of items to display to the buyer, but
has no control over the posted prices, which are determined
endogenously by competition among the displayed sellers.
To capture the competition among the sellers, we use a
Bertrand competition game [3], [11], [12], wherein the seller
of each item sets a price to maximize its own revenue. More
precisely, let S ⊆ [n] be the set of items that are displayed by
the online platform to a specific buyer. Consider a Bertrand
game between the sellers (players) in S, where an action
for seller i is to set a price p¯i ≥ 0 on its item. Given the
profile of prices p¯(S) := (p¯i, i ∈ S), the revenue of seller
i ∈ S is given by the expected amount of item i that is
sold, based on (1), multiplied by the price of that item, i.e.,
Ri(p¯(S)) := p¯i(S) · q¯i(p¯(S)). Assuming that in the induced
Bertrand game (S, p¯(S),R(p¯(S))), each seller maximizes
its own revenue, the unique pure Nash equilibrium prices
can be computed in a closed form as [1, Theorems 1 & 2]:
pi(S) =
1
1− qi(S) i ∈ S, (2)
2By convention, we assume that the price of {0} is normalized to p0 = 0.
where qi(S) is the MNL demand probability (1) computed at
the equilibrium prices p(S). If we substitute the probabilities
from (1) into (2) and solve for equilibrium prices p(S), we
can obtain a closed-form solution for the equilibrium prices
and the equilibrium demands in terms of the “no-purchase”
probability q0(S) as [1, Theorem 2]:
qi(S) = V
(
q0(S)e
θi−1), i ∈ S. (3)
Here, V (x) : R+ → [0, 1) is a strictly increasing and concave
function given by the unique solution of y exp( y1−y ) = x,
and q0(S) is given by the unique solution of the equation∑
i∈S
V (q0(S)e
θi−1) = 1− q0(S). (4)
Thus, by offering assortment S, the expected revenue that
seller i derives at the Nash equilibrium equals to
Ri(S) =
{
qi(S)
1−qi(S) , if i ∈ S,
0 if i /∈ S, (5)
where qi(S) is given by (3). Finally, we let
R(S) :=
∑
i∈S
qi(S)
1− qi(S)
be the expected revenue obtained by offering assortment S.
Sellers do not need to be very intelligent to choose their
prices according to the Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand
game. Simply by knowing the quality of items, each seller
i can easily compute its equilibrium demand qi(S) for an
offered assortment via (3) and (4), and then set its price
to pi(S) = 11−qi(S) . Moreover, as the inventory levels
are private information of the sellers, a seller cannot use
information on others’ inventories to compute equilibrium
price/demands. On the other hand, the reason why the
platform should design its algorithm based on the equilibrium
prices of sellers is that the Bertrand game induces a potential
game [32]. Consequently, if each seller sets its price most
naturally by best responding to others’ posted prices (i.e.,
setting to argmaxpi Ri(p(S))), then the prices converge
quickly to the equilibrium of the Bertrand game through
the repetition of interactions. For instance, in the case of
Airbnb, the platform has access to prices at the time when it
chooses an assortment for recommendation [34]. That leads
to a repeated game in which Airbnb chooses an assortment
based on current prices, and that, over time, induces a change
in prices as the hosts optimize. Thus, equilibrium prices can
be viewed as stationary prices in the steady-state game.
Remark 1: For an assortment S and price profile p =
p(S), the function Φ(p(S)) :=
∏
j∈S pj exp(θj−pj)∑
j∈S∪{0} exp(θj−pj) , serves
as a potential function for the single-buyer Bertrand game.
This function is simply the (normalized) sum of the sellers’
revenues in the logarithm space. More precisely, given price
profiles p = (pi, p−i) and p′ = (p′i, p−i), we have ln Φ(p) ∝∑
j∈S ln rj(p), where rj(p) = pjqj denotes the revenue of
seller j for posted price pj , and the corresponding demand qj
that is calculated according to (1). In particular, the potential
difference ln Φ(p)− ln Φ(p′) is equal to
ln Φ(p)− ln Φ(p′) = ln ri(p)− ln ri(p′)
= ln
(pieθi−pi
p′ie
θi−p′i
)
+ln
(eθi−p′i+∑j∈S∪{0}\{i} eθj−pj
eθi−pi+
∑
j∈S∪{0}\{i} eθj−pj
)
.
Thus, sellers’ best responses increase the potential function,
and the prices converge to a pure Nash equilibrium [3].
Example 1: A closer look at (5) reveals that the revenue
for an item depends on the offered assortment. As we shall
see, that makes the analysis of assortment dynamics much
more complicated than the conventional models in which
items have fixed revenues, regardless of the offered assort-
ments. Such dependency creates externalities between items,
as the revenue of an item now depends on other items that are
bundled with it. To illustrate such dependency, let us consider
an example with two items of qualities θ1 = 1, θ2 = 2. If
the platform offers assortment S = {1}, which includes the
first item only, then by solving (4) we get q0({1}) = 0.64,
and thus q1({1}) = 1 − q0({1}) = 0.34. In particular,
the equilibrium price for item 1 in this case is given by
p1({1}) = 11−0.34 = 1.56. Therefore, from (5), the expected
revenue of item 1 is equal to R1({1}) = 0.34×1.56 = 0.53.
As there is only one item in the assortment, that value is also
equal to the total expected revenue, i.e., R({1}) = 0.53.
Now consider the case that in which platform offers
both items, i.e., S = {1, 2}. Then, by solving (4), we get
q0({1, 2}) = 0.34. Using (3) we have q1({1, 2}) = 0.23 and
q2({1, 2}) = 0.43. Therefore, in this case, the equilibrium
price for item 1 equals p1({1, 2}) = 11−0.23 = 1.29, which
is lower than that in the previous case. The reason is that
offering a larger assortment increases the competition among
the sellers so that they choose to set their prices lower in
order to attract more demand. In particular, the expected
revenue for item 1, in this case, is R1({1, 2}) = 0.3, which
is much less than that in the previous case. Note, however,
that the total revenue of offering assortment S = {1, 2}
is R({1, 2}) = 1.05, which is much greater than the total
revenue in the previous case. The reason is that offering more
items attracts higher demand, even though at lower prices.
B. Online Optimization Problem for the Platform
The online assortment problem that is faced by the online
platform is that of selecting a sequence of assortments subject
to inventory constraints so as to maximize the aggregate
expected revenue given by
m∑
t=1
E[R(St)] =
m∑
t=1
E
[∑
i∈St
qi(St)
1− qi(St)
]
, (6)
where S1, S2, . . . , Sm are random variables denoting the
assortments offered by the platform at times t = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Here, the offered assortments must satisfy the inventory
constraints, meaning that an item i ∈ [n] can be included
in St at time t only if it is still available at that time, i.e., if
its ci units have not been fully sold to buyers 1, 2, . . . , t−1.
It is worth noting that the available inventory of an item
at a time t depends not only on the assortments offered by
the platform up to that time, but also on the buyers’ choice
realizations up to time t. Therefore, an online algorithm must
satisfy the inventory constraints for any realized sample path
of buyers’ choices.
Finally, we note that the platform can use either a de-
terministic or a randomized online algorithm, where by an
online algorithm we refer to an algorithm that does not know
the total number of buyers m or the initial inventory of the
sellers c, nor does it have access to the random choices
realized by buyers. In other words, the only information
to which an online algorithm has access before it makes
a decision at time t is the quality of items θ and whether
or not an item is available at that time. On the other hand,
an offline algorithm knows all the parameters m, c, and θ a
priori, but not the realization of the buyers’ random choices.
To evaluate the performance of an online algorithm, we use
the notion of a competitive ratio, as defined next.
Definition 1: Given α > 0, an online algorithm for the
dynamic assortment problem is called α-competitive if for
every instance it achieves in expectation an α-fraction of the
total revenue obtained by any offline algorithm that knows
the number of buyers and inventory levels a priori.
III. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
In this section, we state and prove several useful lemmas
that will later be used to establish our main results. To devise
a competitive algorithm, we first derive an upper bound for
the expected revenue that any offline algorithm can obtain
and use it as a benchmark to compare the performance of our
online algorithm with that upper bound. This upper bound
can be obtained by writing an LP whose optimal objective
value is no less than that of any feasible offline algorithm.
(We refer the reader to [13], [14], [17] for a similar method
for devising online competitive algorithms.) Let us assume
that the number of buyers m and inventory levels ci,∀i are
known and consider an LP whose optimal objective value
(OPT) is given by
OPT = max
m∑
t=1
∑
S
R(S)yt(S)
s.t.
m∑
t=1
∑
S
q(S)yt(S) ≤ c,
yt ∈ ∆2n ,∀t = 1, . . . ,m. (7)
Here, c = (c1, . . . , cn)′ is the column vector of initial
inventories, and q(S) = (q1(S), . . . , qn(S))′ is the column
vector of equilibrium purchasing probabilities, where qi(S)
is obtained from (3) and is the equilibrium demand for item
i given that assortment S is offered. Moreover, for each t,
the variable vector yt = (yt(S) : S ⊆ [n]) belongs to the
probability simplex ∆2n := {y ≥ 0 :
∑
S⊆[n] y(S) = 1},
where yt(S) can be viewed as the probability that the
algorithm will offer assortment S to the buyer at time t. Thus,
the first n constraints in (7) capture the inventory constraints,
which are written in a vector form.
Next, we show that any online algorithm generates a
feasible solution to the LP in (7) with an objective value
that is equal to the expected revenue of that algorithm.
To see that, let S1, . . . , Sm be random variables denoting
the assortments offered by the algorithm at time steps t =
1, . . . ,m. Moreover, let ηt be a random variable denoting the
item that is purchased by the buyer at time t. Then, for every
realized sample path
∑m
t=1
∑
S 1{St = S, ηt = i} ≤ ci,
∀i ∈ [n], where 1{·} is the indicator function. By taking
expectation from that inequality over all sample paths, we
can write
m∑
t=1
∑
S
P(St=S)qti(S)=
m∑
t=1
∑
S
P(St=S)P(ηt= i|St=S)
=
m∑
t=1
∑
S
E[1{St=S, ηt= i}] ≤ ci.
Thus, setting yt(S) := P(St = S) forms a feasible solution
to the LP in (7) whose objective value is equal to the expected
revenue of the algorithm, that is,
∑m
t=1
∑
S R(S)P(St = S).
That shows that the OPT provides an upper bound for the
revenue obtained by any offline algorithm.
We note that in the online assortment problem, we restrict
our attention to identical buyers such that R(S) and q(S)
do not depend on t. The reason is that if Rt(S), qt(S) can
also depend on the type of buyers, then, as is shown in
the following theorem, no online algorithm can achieve a
constant competitive ratio.
Theorem 1: There is no constant competitive algorithm
for the online assortment problem with heterogeneous buy-
ers’ evaluations.
Proof: Consider a single item with unit inventory c = 1,
and, for simplicity, we drop all the indices that denote that
item. Consider an adversary who first selects the number of
buyers m and their quality evaluations (types) θt, t ∈ [m],
and then reveals them sequentially over time to the seller. Let
M > 0 be a large number, and for t ∈ Z+, we choose θt
such that the expected revenue of selling the item to buyer t
equals M t. Note that such a selection is possible because the
expected revenue function q1−q is a continuously increasing
function and admits any value in [0,∞). Moreover, as M
is a large number, for any buyer t, the equality q1−q = M
t
implies that q ≥ 12 . In other words, if the item is offered to
any buyer, it is purchased with probability at least 12 .
Now let I = {(θ1), (θ1, θ2), (θ1, θ2, . . . , θt), . . .} be the
set of input sequences that can be chosen by the adversary. To
derive a contradiction, let us assume that there exists an α-
competitive (randomized) algorithm ALG for some α > 0.
Then, ALG must offer the item to the first arriving buyer
with probability β1 ≥ α. The reason is that for the unit
length instance (θ1), that is, when the adversary chooses
to send only one buyer of type θ1, the expected revenue
obtained by ALG is β1M . On the other hand, the optimal
offline algorithm OPT that knows the adversary’s sequence
will offer the item to the first buyer with probability one and
derives an expected revenue of M . As the expected revenue
of ALG for any instance must be at least α-fraction of the
optimal revenue, we have β1MM ≥ α.
Using induction, we next show that for any t ≥ 2, the ALG
must offer the item to buyer t with some probability βt ≥ α.
First, we note that after revealing the first t−1 buyers to the
ALG, all the remaining instances in I are indistinguishable
so that the ALG cannot draw any conclusion about the input
sequence. Moreover, the ALG must perform well on any
input sequence. Therefore, if the adversary chooses the input
instance to be (θ1, . . . , θt), the expected revenue of the ALG
is at most
t−1∑
`=1
M ` + P
{
item is available at time t
}
βtM
t
≤
t−1∑
`=1
M `+ P
{
item is available at t−1}(1− βt−1
2
)
βtM
t
≤
t−1∑
`=1
M ` +
( t−1∏
`=1
(
1− β`
2
))
βtM
t
<
M t
M − 1 +
(
1− α
2
)t−1
βtM
t,
where the first inequality holds because the probability that
the item is available at time t is equal to the probability that
the item is available at time t− 1 multiplied by the sum of
two conditional probabilities: i) the probability that the item
is not offered at time t − 1 given that it is available (this
probability is 1− βt−1), and ii) the probability that the item
was offered at time t− 1 and was not sold, given that it was
available (this probability is at most βt−12 ). The last inequality
holds by the induction hypothesis as β` ≥ α,∀` ≤ t− 1. On
the other hand, the expected revenue of OPT in this instance
is M t, as it offers the item with a probability of one to buyer
t. Thus,
M t
M − 1 +
(
1− α
2
)t−1
βtM
t > αM t. (8)
Since M is a large number (e.g., M = 2α2 + 1), and t ≥ 2,
we conclude that βt ≥ α. This completes the induction.
Finally, as βt ∈ [0, 1],∀t, using (8), we must have,
α− 1M−1(
1− α2
)t−1 < βt ≤ 1,
which cannot hold for a sufficiently large t. This contradic-
tion shows that no online algorithm can be α-competitive for
any constant α > 0.
A. Substitutability Property and Items’ Heaviness
Here, we prove several useful lemmas for our later anal-
ysis. We start with the following so-called substitutability
property which essentially says that the demand for a par-
ticular item decreases as more items are offered.
Lemma 1: For any assortment S and two items i ∈ S, j /∈
S, we have qi(S) ≥ qi(S ∪ {j}) and Ri(S) ≥ Ri(S ∪ {j}).
Proof: First note that offering more items reduces the
probability that no item will be purchased at the equilibrium,
because if q0(S) denotes the no-purchase probability at the
equilibrium, then 1− q0(S) =
∑
r∈S V (q0(S)e
θr−1), where
V (·) is a strictly increasing function. Now if we offer a larger
assortment S ∪ {j}, we must have q0(S ∪ {j}) ≤ q0(S).
Otherwise, offering S ∪ {j} can only increase the right side
of the former equality while decreasing its left side, implying
that 1 − q0(S ∪ {j}) <
∑
r∈S∪{j} V (q0(S ∪ {j})eθr−1).
This contradiction shows that q0(S∪{j}) ≤ q0(S). Now, by
monotonicity of V (·) and using (3), we have,
qi(S)=V (q0(S)e
θi−1)≥V (q0(S∪{j})eθi−1)=qi(S∪{j}).
In other words, offering more items in the assortment reduces
the market share for the existing ones. That also implies that
the revenue derived from an item i if it is offered in a larger
set is less than when it is offered in a smaller set, as
Ri(S) =
qi(S)
1− qi(S) ≥
qi(S ∪ {j})
1− qi(S ∪ {j}) = Ri(S ∪ {j}).
Definition 2: Let λ ∈ ( 12 , 1) be a fixed parameter. An item
i is called heavy if offering it alone obtains at least λ-fraction
of the market share, i.e., qi({i}) ≥ λ. An item i is heavier
than item j if qi({i}) ≥ qj({j}). We use [h] = {1, 2, . . . , h}
to denote the set of heavy items, if any, and refer to any
other item i /∈ [h] as a light item.
Note that if it has access to items’ qualities, an online
algorithm can use (3) and (4) to easily compute the expected
demands qi({i}) a priori. Therefore, for a fixed threshold λ,
we may assume without loss of generality that an online
algorithm knows the heaviness of all the items. Later, we
will optimize the competitive ratio of our devised algorithm
over λ ∈ (0, 12 ) to obtain the optimal heaviness threshold.
Remark 2: As items are sorted according to their qualities
θ1 ≥ . . . ≥ θn, using (3) and the monotonicity of V (·), one
can see that the same order must hold on the heaviness of
the items, i.e., q1({1}) ≥ . . . ≥ qn({n}).
Lemma 2: Let f(λ) := max{1+( 1−λλ )2, 1λ}. Consider an
arbitrary assortment S, and let i ∈ [h] be a heavy item that
is at least as heavy as any other item in S. Then, offering i
alone obtains at least f(λ)-fraction of the expected revenue
of offering S, i.e., R(S) ≤ f(λ) qi({i})1−qi({i}) .
Proof: As i is a heavy item, qi({i}) ≥ λ. Now let us
first assume i ∈ S, meaning that i is the heaviest item in S.
Case I: If qi(S) ≥ λ, by
∑
j∈S∪{0} qj(S) = 1, we have∑
j∈S\{i} qj(S) ≤ 1− λ. Thus qj(S) ≤ 1− λ ∀j ∈ S \ {i},
and we can write
R(S) =
qi(S)
1− qi(S) +
∑
j∈S\{i}
qj(S)
1− qj(S)
≤ qi(S)
1− qi(S) +
1
λ
∑
j∈S\{i}
qj(S)
≤ qi(S)
1− qi(S) +
1− λ
λ
≤ (1 + (1− λ
λ
)2
) qi(S)
1− qi(S)
≤ (1 + (1− λ
λ
)2
) qi({i})
1− qi({i}) ,
where the third inequality holds because qi(S)1−qi(S) ≥ λ1−λ ,
and the last inequality holds because qi(S) ≤ qi({i}) by the
substitutability property (Lemma 1).
Case II: If qi(S) < λ, since i is the heaviest item in S, for
any other j ∈ S we must have qj(S) < λ. As a result,
R(S) =
∑
j∈S
qj(S)
1− qj(S) ≤
1
1− λ
∑
j∈S
qj(S)
≤ 1
1− λ ≤
1
λ
qi({i})
1− qi({i}) , (9)
where the last inequality holds because qi({i}) ≥ λ.
Finally, if i /∈ S, then either S does not contain any
heavy item, in which case qj(S) < λ,∀j ∈ S, and the
same chain of inequalities in (9) holds, or S contains at
least one heavy item. In the latter case, let k ∈ S be
the heaviest item in S. Now, using the proof of Case I,
we have R(S) ≤ (1 + ( 1−λλ )2) qk({k})1−qk({k}) . Since by the
assumption, i is heavier than k, qk({k}) ≤ qi({i}), implying
R(S) ≤ (1 + ( 1−λλ )2) qi({i})1−qi({i}) . Therefore, if we define
f(λ) = max{1 + ( 1−λλ )2, 1λ}, both of the above cases hold
and we have R(S) ≤ f(λ) qi({i})1−qi({i}) .
The next lemma shows that in the absence of heavy items,
a simple greedy algorithm that offers all the available items at
each round is 12 -competitive. We shall use this lemma latter to
connect the revenue obtained during the second phase of our
algorithm to the revenue of the optimal offline benchmark.
Lemma 3: An online algorithm that at each time offers all
the available items achieves at least 12 of the following LP:
max
m∑
t=1
∑
S
∑
i
qi(S)y
t(S)
s.t.
m∑
t=1
∑
S
q(S)yt(S) ≤ c,
yt ∈ ∆2n ,∀t = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof: Consider a virtual online assortment problem
with initial inventory c and purchase probabilities q(S) as
in the original online assortment problem, except that each
item i has a fixed constant revenue ri. In other words, the
expected revenue obtained by including i in an assortment S
equals to Ri(S) = riqi(S). Using an argument similar to that
in Section III, we find that the optimal offline revenue for
the virtual problem is upper-bounded by the optimal value
of the following LP:
OPT(r) = max
m∑
t=1
∑
S
(∑
i
riqi(S)
)
yt(S)
s.t.
m∑
t=1
∑
S
q(S)yt(S) ≤ c,
yt ∈ ∆2n ,∀t = 1, . . . ,m, (10)
where r = (r1, . . . , rn). It has been shown in [13, Example
1] that a greedy online algorithm that at time t offers the
maximizing assortment
St = argmax
S⊆At
∑
i∈S
riqi(S), (11)
is 12 -competitive with respect to OPT(r), where At denotes
the set of available items at time t. Since both the original
and virtual assortment problems, as well as their offline LP
benchmarks (7) and (10), share the same inventory con-
straints, any feasible online algorithm for one is also feasible
for the other one. The only difference is in their expected ob-
jective revenues that are given by
∑m
t=1 E
[∑
i∈St
qi(St)
1−qi(St)
]
and
∑m
t=1 E
[∑
i∈St riqi(St)
]
, respectively. Now, let r = 1,
and denote the expected revenue of the greedy algorithm
on the original and virtual problems by Revog and Rev
v
g(1),
respectively. As qi(S)1−qi(S) ≥ qi(S),∀i, S, a simple coupling
shows that
Revog ≥ Revvg(1) ≥
1
2
OPT(1).
Finally, when r = 1, at each time t, the greedy rule in (11)
offers the assortment
St = argmax
S⊆At
∑
i∈S
qi(S) = argmax
S⊆At
(
1− q0(S)
)
,
where by (4), the right side is maximized if St = At.
IV. A DETERMINISTIC COMPETITIVE ALGORITHM FOR
THE ONLINE ASSORTMENT PROBLEM
In this section, we first describe a deterministic online
assortment algorithm and then prove its performance guar-
antee. The proposed algorithm is very simple and requires
only sorting of the items with an overall computation of
O(mn log n). The algorithm consists of two phases. In the
first phase, we take care of the heavy items (if any) by
offering them alone until either they are fully sold or no
buyer is left. We then take care of the light items by offering
them all together in larger bundles. A formal description of
this hybrid algorithm, which we shall refer to as “Alg”, is
summarized below.
Algorithm 1 A Deterministic Online Hybrid Algorithm
Phase 1: Let [h] = {1, 2, . . . , h} denote the set of heavy
items that are sorted according to their quality (heaviness),
i.e., θ1 ≥ . . . ≥ θh. Starting from time t = 0, offer the items
in [h] individually and according to their quality order until
all the heavy items have been fully sold, and go to Phase 2.
Phase 2: At each time t, bundle all the available light items
together and offer them to buyer t until either we run out of
items or no buyer is left.
Note that since an online algorithm does not know the
number of buyers or the sellers’ initial inventory levels
ahead of time, a competitive online algorithm must carefully
balance a trade-off between two scenarios: 1) increasing the
chance of selling items by offering larger assortments (hence
reducing prices) when there are only a few buyers and many
items, and 2) reducing the competition among the sellers by
offering smaller assortments (hence increasing prices) when
there are many buyers and only a few items. In fact, the
desire to balance those two cases is the main reason why
the two phases of Algorithm 1 were developed. It is worth
noting that Algorithm 1 can be implemented in a fully online
fashion and that does not need to know anything about the
number of buyers m or the initial inventory levels c. At each
time t, it only needs to know whether there is an arriving
buyer and whether an item is still available at that time.
Finally, we note that because of the random realization of
buyers’ choices, the time at which Phase 1 in Algorithm 1
terminates is a random variable τ , which can be at most
min{m,∑ni=1 ci}. The following lemma shows that for all
sample paths that Algorithm 1 has a chance to enter in its
second phase (i.e., τ < m), the expected revenue obtained
during Phase 2 is within a constant factor of the total revenue
that light items contribute to the optimal offline benchmark.
Lemma 4: Let ω be any sample path of length τ(ω) <
m that may be realized during Phase 1 of Algorithm 1.
Conditioned on ω, the expected revenue obtained in Phase 2
is at least 1−λ2 of the total revenue that light items contribute
to OPT after time τ(ω).
Proof: Let {yt}mt=τ(ω)+1 be the optimal offline solution
to LP in (7) over [τ(ω)+1,m]. The total contribution of light
items L = [n]\[h] to the revenue of OPT after time τ(ω) is
D :=
m∑
t=τ(ω)+1
∑
i∈L
∑
S⊆[n]
qi(S)
1− qi(S)y
t(S).
Now let us consider
max
m∑
t=τ(ω)+1
∑
i∈L
∑
T⊆L
qi(T )x
t(T )
s.t.
m∑
t=τ(ω)+1
∑
T⊆L
qi(T )x
t(T ) ≤ ci ∀i ∈ L,
xt ∈ ∆2|L| t = τ + 1, . . . ,m, (12)
and notice that (12) is precisely the LP relaxation upper
bound for any online algorithm that can be used during
Phase 2 with constant revenues ri = 1,∀i ∈ L. On the other
hand, by Lemma 3, the greedy algorithm used during Phase 2
obtains at least 12 of the optimal value in (12). Thus, if there
exists a feasible solution to (12) with an objective value of
at least (1 − λ)D, then we can conclude that the revenue
obtained during Phase 2 is at least (1−λ)D2 , completing the
proof. Therefore, in the rest of the proof, we proceed to
construct a feasible solution to (12) with an objective value
of at least (1− λ)D.
Let us fix an arbitrary t ∈ [τ(ω) + 1,m] and, for
simplicity, we drop the time superscript t. Define pi :=∑
S⊆[n] qi(S)y(S) for i ∈ L, and consider the following
auxiliary LP:
min
∑
i∈L
(
∑
T⊆L
qi(T )z(T )− pi)
s.t.
∑
T⊆L
qi(T )z(T )− pi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ L,
z ∈ ∆2|L| . (13)
Note that (13) is a feasible LP, because for any i ∈ L and
using the substitutability property, we have
pi =
∑
S⊆[n]
qi(S)y(S) ≤
∑
S⊆[n]
qi(S\[h])y(S)
=
∑
T⊆L
( ∑
S\[h]=T
y(S)
)
qi(T ),
and hence z(T ) =
∑
S\[h]=T y(S), T ⊆ L is a feasible
solution to (13).
Next, we show that the optimal value of (13) is zero. To
derive a contradiction, let z∗ be an optimal solution to (13)
with a strictly positive objective value, and let i∗ be an item
for which
∑
T⊆L qi∗(T )z
∗(T ) − pi∗ > 0. That means that
there exists T ∗ ⊆ L such that i∗ ∈ T ∗ and z∗(T ∗) > 0.
Note that T ∗ must contain at least one item other than i∗.
Otherwise, if T ∗ = {i∗}, reducing z∗(T ∗) by a small positive
amount and increasing z∗(∅) by the same amount will give
us another feasible solution to (13) with a strictly smaller
objective value, contradicting the optimality of z∗. Now let
us partition the items in T ∗ into T ∗1 and T
∗
2 , where
T ∗1 = {i ∈ T ∗ :
∑
T⊆L
qi(T )z
∗(T )− pi > 0},
T ∗2 = {i ∈ T ∗ :
∑
T⊆L
qi(T )z
∗(T )− pi = 0}.
By the definition of T ∗1 , that means that there exists a positive
number 1 > 0 such that reducing z∗(T ∗) to z∗(T ∗) − 1,
i.e., setting z∗(T ∗) = z∗(T ∗)−1 (by abuse of notation), will
preserve the feasibility of all the constraints associated with
items i ∈ T ∗1 . Note that such a change can only affect the fea-
sibility of the constraints i ∈ T ∗ and has no influence on the
constraints i /∈ T ∗ (as qi(T ∗) = 0,∀i /∈ T ∗). Unfortunately,
the update violates the constraints i ∈ T ∗2 such that in the
new solution
∑
T⊆L qi(T )z
∗(T )−pi = −1qi(T ∗),∀i ∈ T ∗2 .
However, we will show that one can sequentially redistribute
the 1-mass that was removed from T ∗ to nested subsets of
T ∗2 and again satisfy all the constraints in i ∈ T ∗2 at equality.
Let 2 := mini∈T∗2
qi(T
∗)1
qi(T∗2 )
, and note that by the sub-
stitutability property and since T ∗2 ⊂ T ∗, we have 2 < 1.
Therefore, if we return an 2 amount from 1-mass to z∗(T ∗2 ),
i.e., set z∗(T ∗2 ) = z
∗(T ∗2 ) + 2, each constraint in i ∈ T ∗2
becomes “more” feasible, and at least one constraint (namely
the one that achieves argmini∈T∗2
qi(T
∗)
qi(T∗2 )
1) is satisfied by
equality. Let T ∗3 ⊂ T ∗2 be all the items in T ∗2 that are not
satisfied by equality after the update, i.e.,
T ∗3 ={i∈T ∗2 :
∑
T⊆L
qi(T )z
∗(T )−pi= 2qi(T ∗2)−1qi(T ∗)<0},
and define 3 := mini∈T∗3
1qi(T
∗)−2qi(T∗2 )
qi(T∗3 )
. Again by sub-
stitutability and since T ∗3 ⊂ T ∗2 ⊂ T ∗, we have
1qi(T
∗)− 2qi(T ∗2 )
qi(T ∗3 )
≤ (1 − 2)qi(T
∗)
qi(T ∗3 )
≤1 − 2, ∀i ∈ T ∗3 ,
and thus 3 < 1 − 2. Therefore, if we relocate an 3
amount of the leftover mass 1 − 2 to z∗(T ∗3 ) by setting
z∗(T ∗2 ) = z
∗(T ∗2 ) + 3, every constraint in i ∈ T ∗3 becomes
more feasible, and at least one constraint is tight at equality.
By repeating that argument inductively, one can see that the
substitutability property means that we always have enough
leftover mass to make one more constraint in T ∗2 tight so that
at the end of this process all the constraints in T ∗2 are satisfied
at equality. Finally, using  := 1 − 2 − 3 − . . . to denote
the leftover mass at the end of this process, we can relocate
that mass to the empty set by setting z∗(∅) = z∗(∅)+ . The
last step does not affect the feasibility of any constraints and
only guarantees that the mass conservation is preserved so
that z∗ ∈ ∆2|L| . Thus, at the end of the process, we obtain
a feasible solution to (13) with a strictly smaller objective
value than the initial optimal solution z∗, a contradiction.
Therefore, the optimal value of (13) is zero, and there exists
z∗ ∈ ∆2|L| such that∑
T⊆L
qi(T )z
∗(T ) =
∑
S⊆[n]
qi(S)y(S),∀i ∈ L.
As the above argument holds for any t ∈ [τ(ω) + 1,m],
we obtain a feasible solution {z∗t}mt=τ(ω)+1 to (12) that
consumes the exact same amount of each resource i ∈ L that
is consumed by the optimal offline solution {yt}mt=τ(ω)+1. In
particular, the objective value of (12) for {z∗t}mt=τ+1 equals
m∑
t=τ(ω)+1
∑
i∈L
∑
T⊆L
qi(T )z
∗t(T )=
m∑
t=τ(ω)+1
∑
i∈L
∑
S⊆[n]
qi(S)y
t(S)
≥ (1− λ)
T∑
t=τ(ω)+1
∑
i∈L
∑
S⊆[n]
qi(S)
1− qi(S)y
t(S) = (1− λ)D,
where the inequality holds by the fact that for every light
item i ∈ L, qi(S)1−qi(S) ≤
qi(S)
1−λ . This completes the proof.
Definition 3: We let Ω denote the set of all sample paths
ω that can be realized during the execution of Phase 1 of
Algorithm 1. We define A ⊆ Ω to include sample paths for
which all the heavy items are fully sold during Phase 1, and
A¯ = Ω \ A to be all sample paths for which the algorithm
does not even get a chance to enter its second phase.
Lemma 5: Let E[R(Alg)|A] denote the expected revenue
of Algorithm 1 over all the sample paths in A. Then, we
have OPT ≤ 21−λE[R(Alg)|A].
Proof: Let τi : Ω→ Z+ be a random variable denoting
the first time that item i ∈ [h] is fully sold during Phase 1
of the algorithm, where we note that τ1 ≤ . . . ≤ τh. Then
A = {ω ∈ Ω : τh(ω) ≤ m}. We first derive a lower bound
for E[R(Alg)|A]. Given an arbitrary sample path ω ∈ A, the
revenue obtained during Phase 1 equals to R(Phase 1|ω) =∑h
i=1
ci
1−qi({i}) . The reason is that over that sample path, all
the ci units of item i ∈ [h] are fully sold at an equilibrium
price of 11−qi({i}) (as heavy items are offered individually).
Thus,
E[R(Alg)|A] =
h∑
i=1
ci
1− qi({i}) + E[R(Phase 2)|A]. (14)
Now, given any sample path ω ∈ A and using Lemma 2, we
can upper-bound the revenue of OPT up to time τ1(ω) as
τ1(ω)∑
t=1
∑
S
R(S)yt(S) ≤
τ1(ω)∑
t=1
∑
S
f(λ)q1({1})
1− q1({1}) y
t(S)
=
τ1(ω)∑
t=1
f(λ)q1({1})
1− q1({1}) =
f(λ)q1({1})
1− q1({1}) τ1(ω).
Also, the total contribution of item 1 to the value of OPT is
m∑
t=1
∑
S
q1(S)
1− q1(S)y
t(S) ≤
m∑
t=1
∑
S
q1(S)
1− q1({1})y
t(S)
=
1
1− q1({1})
m∑
t=1
∑
S
q1(S)y
t(S) ≤ c1
1− q1({1}) ,
where the first inequality is by the substitutability property,
and the second inequality is true because {yt(S)} is a
feasible solution to (7). As we have considered the total
contribution of item 1 to OPT, we can safely remove item
1 from all the assortments offered by OPT and upper-bound
the remaining revenue of OPT over [τ1(ω) + 1, τ2(ω)] as
τ2(ω)∑
t=τ1(ω)+1
∑
S
(
R(S)− q1(S)
1− q1(S)
)
yt(S)
≤
τ2(ω)∑
t=τ1(ω)+1
∑
S
R(S\{1})yt(S)
≤
τ2(ω)∑
t=τ1(ω)+1
∑
S
f(λ)q2({2})
1− q2({2}) y
t(S)
=
f(λ)q2({2})
1− q2({2}) (τ2(ω)− τ1(ω)),
where the first inequality is by the substitutability property,
and the second inequality is from Lemma 2 (as the heaviest
item in S \{1} at best can be item 2). In particular, the total
contribution of item 2 to the value of OPT is
m∑
t=1
∑
S
q2(S)
1− q2(S)y
t(S) ≤
m∑
t=1
∑
S
q2(S)
1− q2({2})y
t(S)
=
1
1− q2({2})
m∑
t=1
∑
S
q2(S)y
t(S) ≤ c2
1− q2({2}) .
Again, we can safely remove item 2 from all the assortments
in OPT and repeat the same process until all the heavy
items have been completely removed from the assortments
offered by OPT. At the end of that process, we will be
left only with light items whose contribution to the OPT
is
∑m
t=τh(ω)+1
∑
S
∑
i∈L
qi(S)
1−qi(S)y
t(S). But from Lemma
4, that value is at most 21−λE[R(Phase 2)|ω], where the
expectation is taken with respect to buyers’ random choices
during the second phase of the algorithm. Thus, for every
sample path ω ∈ A, we have shown that OPT is upper-
bounded by
OPT ≤
h∑
i=1
f(λ)qi({i})
1− qi({i}) (τi(ω)− τi−1(ω))
+
h∑
i=1
ci
1− qi({i}) +
2
1− λE[R(Phase 2)|ω],
where by convention τ0 := 0. Taking the conditional expec-
tation E[·|A] from that inequality over all ω ∈ A, we get
OPT ≤
h∑
i=1
f(λ)qi({i})
1− qi({i}) E[τi − τi−1|A]
+
h∑
i=1
ci
1− qi({i}) +
2
1− λE[R(Phase 2)|A].
Finally, we note that E[τi−τi−1|A] ≤ ciqi({i}) .3 If we combine
that relation with the above inequality, we obtain
OPT ≤
h∑
i=1
(1 + f(λ))ci
1− qi({i}) +
2
1− λE[R(Phase 2)|A]
≤ 2
1− λE[R(Alg)|A],
where the second inequality is due to (14) and the fact that
1 + f(λ) ≤ 21−λ ,∀λ ≥ 12 .
In the following, we prove the main result of this section,
which is the first constant competitive ratio for the online
assortment problem. The main idea of the proof is to show
that if Algorithm 1 does not get a chance to enter its second
phase, the reason is that the number of buyers m is small.
Otherwise, the revenue obtained from Phase 1 is sufficiently
large compared to the optimal offline benchmark OPT.
Theorem 2: Algorithm 1 is a deterministic constant-
competitive algorithm for the online assortment problem with
homogeneous buyers. In particular, E[R(Alg)]OPT ≥ 0.1.
Proof: Let c :=
∑h
i=1 ci be the total number of heavy
items, and define B ⊆ A¯ to be the subset of sample paths in
A¯ that sell at least a heavy items during Phase 1, for some
a ≤ min{m, c} to be determined later. More precisely, let
X : Ω → Z+ be a random variable denoting the number
of heavy items sold during Phase 1, and note that X ≤ m.
Then, B := {ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) > a, τh(ω) > m}. We have
P(B) = P(τh > m)P(X > a|τh > m)
= P(A¯)
(
1− P(m−X ≥ m− a|τh > m))
≥ P(A¯)
(
1− E[m−X|τh > m]
m− a
)
≥ P(A¯)
(
1− E[m−X]
P(A¯)(m− a)
)
, (15)
where the first inequality is by Markov’s inequality, and
the second inequality is true because E[m − X] ≥ E[m −
3Note that conditioning on the event A puts an upper bound on the
random variable τi − τi−1, hence only resulting in a lower expectation.
X|A¯]P(A¯). On the other hand, we know that at each time
a heavy item i is offered, it is sold independently with a
probability of at least qi({i}) ≥ λ. Therefore, E[X] ≥
min{λm, c}. By combining that relation with (15), we obtain
P(B) ≥ P(A¯) + min{λm, c} −m
m− a . (16)
Now consider an arbitrary sample path ω ∈ B that sells
X(ω) ≥ a heavy items. To upper-bound the revenue of OPT,
let i ∈ [h] be the last heavy item that is sold over ω. From
Lemma 2 and using an argument similar to that in the proof
of Lemma 5, we know that OPT can achieve a revenue of
at most
f(λ)R(Alg|ω) +
i−1∑
j=1
ci
1− qj({j}) ≤ (1 + f(λ))R(Alg|ω),
during its first X(ω) time instances and by selling all the
heavy items 1, 2, . . . , i − 1. We can then remove the heavy
items 1, 2, . . . , i − 1 from all the assortments offered by
the OPT after time X(ω), in which case the remaining
assortments offered by OPT over [X(ω) + 1,m] can only
contain item i or lighter items. Based on Lemma 2, that
means that the revenue of each remaining assortment in OPT
is at most f(λ) times the revenue of the individual assortment
{i}. Thus, the remaining revenue obtained by OPT over
[X(ω) + 1,m] is at most (m−X(ω)) f(λ)qi({i})1−qi({i}) . Moreover,
as Algorithm 1 sells X(ω) items of type i or heavier over
ω, we have qi({i})1−qi({i}) ≤
R(Alg|ω)
X(ω) . Putting it all together, for
any ω ∈ B, we have shown that
OPT ≤ (1 + f(λ))R(Alg|ω) + (m−X(ω))f(λ)R(Alg|ω)
X(ω)
= (
f(λ)m+X(ω)
X(ω)
)R(Alg|ω)
≤ (f(λ)m+ a
a
)R(Alg|ω),
where the last inequality is true because X(ω) ≥ a,∀ω ∈ B.
If we take the conditional expectation E[·|B] from both sides
of the above inequality, we get OPT ≤ ( 2m+aa )E[R(Alg)|B].
If we use that together with Lemma 5 and inequality (16),
we can write
E[R(Alg)] ≥ E[R(Alg)|A] · P(A) + E[R(Alg)|B] · P(B)
≥ (1− λ
2
)OPT · P(A) + OPT
( f(λ)m+aa )
· P(B)
≥
(
(
1−λ
2
)P(A)+
P(A¯)+min{λm,c}−mm−a
( f(λ)m+aa )
)
OPT
=
(
P(A)(
1−λ
2
− a
f(λ)m+a
)+
(min{λm, c}−a)a
(f(λ)m+a)(m−a)
)
OPT
=
(
P(A)(
1−λ
2
− x
f(λ) + x
)+
(min{λ, cm}−x)x
(f(λ)+x)(1−x)
)
OPT,
(17)
where x := am ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, by Markov’s inequality,
P(A¯) = P(τh > m) ≤ E[τh]
m
=
∑h
i=0 E[τi − τi−1]
m
=
h∑
i=0
ci
mqi({i}) ≤
c
λm
, (18)
and thus P(A) ≥ (1 − cλm )+ := max{0, 1 − cλm}. If we
substitute that relation into (17) and maximize the result over
x ∈ (0, 1) while considering the worst ratio by minimizing
it over y := cm > 0, the competitive ratio of the algorithm
for a fixed threshold λ is at least
g(λ) := min
y>0
max
x∈(0,1)
{
(1− y
λ
)+
(1− λ
2
− x
f(λ) + x
)
+
(min{λ, y} − x)x
(f(λ) + x)(1− x)
}
.
Finally, by maximizing g(λ) numerically over 12 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
we get maxλ∈[ 12 ,1] g(λ) ' 0.1, that is obtained for x ' 0.19
and λ = 0.63. This shows that the competitive ratio of the
Algorithm 1 with threshold parameter λ = 0.63 is at least
E[R(Alg)]
OPT ≥ 0.1.
Remark 3: In the proof of Theorem 2, one could further
leverage the i.i.d. property of buyers and use tighter Chernoff
bounds rather than Markov’s inequality in (18) to improve
the competitive ratio substantially. However, for the sake of
simplicity, we did not follow that path. Instead, in Section
IV-A, we have conducted some numerical experiments to
illustrated the outperformance of the hybrid algorithm be-
yond the theoretical guarantee of Theorem 2. In fact, one
of the advantages of using Markov’s inequality rather than
Chernoff bound in our analysis is that it can be extended
to obtain constant-competitive ratios for other similar cases
with a certain type of statistical correlation among buyers.
Finally, we want to mention that under additional assump-
tions on the qualities of the items, the structure of Algorithm
1 can be even simpler. For instance, if we assume, as in [3],
that all the items have nonnegative qualities, then, using (3)
and (4) one can show that offering any item i alone still
forces a buyer to purchase it with a large probability of
qi({i}) ≥ 0.2. As a result, every item can be considered
a heavy item up to a multiplicative factor of 0.630.2 . Therefore,
when all items have nonnegative qualities, Algorithm 1 is
simplified to only one phase (Phase 1), which shows that if
θi ≥ 0,∀i, offering items individually in the order of their
qualities achieves a constant competitive ratio. In fact, the
above analysis of the hybrid Algorithm 1 holds even under
a more general setting as long as equilibrium demands and
revenues satisfy the substitutability property given in Lemma
1 and the revenue approximation given in Lemma 2.
A. Numerical Experiments
In this section, we provide the results of some numerical
experiments to demonstrate the efficiency of the hybrid Al-
gorithm 1 beyond the theoretical guarantee given in Theorem
2. In our simulations, we consider a set of n = 10 items with
qualities θ10 = −2, θ9 = −1.5, θ8 = −1, θ7 = −0.5, θ6 =
0.5, θ5 = 1, θ4 = 1.5, θ3 = 2, θ2 = 2.5, θ1 = 3., and
inventory levels ci = 15,∀i ∈ [10]. In each figure, we
evaluate the competitive ratio of the hybrid Algorithm 1 by
changing only one parameter while keeping all other param-
eters fixed. More precisely, we consider the competitive ratio
α := E[R(Alg)]OPT under three different scenarios. In Figure 1,
we have changed the number of buyers from m = 100 to
m = 500 while setting the heaviness threshold to λ = 0.5.
As can be seen, the competitive ratio increases as the number
of items increases, and it approaches 1 for a large number
of buyers. The reason is that for a large m, the Algorithm
1 has enough time to sell each item at its maximum price
by offering it alone. In Figure 2, we again set λ = 0.5
and increase the inventory of the first three items from 1
to 30 (while keeping all others’ inventories fixed). Finally,
in Figure 3, we have illustrated the effect of change of
heaviness threshold λ in the competitive ratio. As λ changes
from λ = 0.5 to λ = 0.9, the competitive ratio changes
between 0.2 to 0.37, with its maximum value achieved for
the threshold λ = 0.63. While that optimal threshold matches
our theoretical analysis, however, it is worth noting that in
this numerical experiment, the competitive ratio for λ = 0.63
is at least α ≥ 0.37, which is pretty good and higher than the
theoretical guarantee α ≥ 0.1. In summary, the competitive
ratio of the hybrid Algorithm 1, in general, has a complicated
nonlinear dependence on each of the problem parameters.
However, as can be seen from all the figures, α ≥ 0.2 for
λ = 0.5, and α ≥ 0.37 for λ = 0.63. In particular, the
competitive ratio can be close to 1 for a certain range of
parameters.
V. OFFLINE GENERALIZED BERTRAND GAME WITH
HETEROGENEOUS BUYERS
As we showed earlier, the online assortment problem with
heterogeneous buyers does not admit a constant competitive
algorithm. To compensate for the nonconstant competitive
ratio of heterogeneous buyers, one might consider identical
buyers that choose according to more general choice models,
or assume heterogeneous buyers whose evaluations belong
to specific distributions. However, in this section, we take
an alternative approach, and consider an offline market with
arbitrary heterogeneous buyers. Analyzing such a generalized
offline market is important for several reasons. i) It provides
a solution to the case in which multiple heterogeneous buyers
simultaneously arrive in the market. ii) While offline markets
with multiple buyers/sellers under oligopolistic competitions,
such as network Cournot competition, have been well studied
[5], [30], [31], the existing results for Bertrand competitions
over general bipartite networks are very limited. iii) Fi-
nally, analyzing the optimal segmentation of the generalized
Bertrand game allows the platform to improve its revenue by
effectively clustering heterogeneous buyers into consistent
classes and matching them to their favorite sellers, hence
improving buyers’ satisfaction.
In the offline generalized Bertrand game, we again assume
that there is a set of [n] sellers in which seller i has ci ∈ Z+
units of product i. Moreover, there is a set of [m] buyers,
Fig. 1. Competitive ratio for λ = 0.5 v.s. change
in the number of buyers.
Fig. 2. Competitive ratio for λ = 0.5 v.s. change
in the inventory levels.
Fig. 3. Competitive ratio v.s. change in the
heaviness threshold of the hybrid Algorithm 1.
in which buyer k’s evaluations of product qualities are given
by real numbers θ1k, . . . , θnk. As before, we also consider
a “no-purchase” item 0 with a normalized price p0 = 0,
and it is assumed that all buyers’ evaluations for the no-
purchase item are θ0k = 0 ∀k ∈ [m]. Now, if we use p =
(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn+ to denote the sellers’ posted prices, the
expected utility derived by seller i is given by
Ui(pi, p−i) := pi min{
m∑
k=1
qik, ci}, (19)
where qik =
exp(θik−pi)
1+
∑n
j=1 exp(θjk−pj) is the MNL probability that
buyer k will purchase item i (i.e., expected demand). Note
that since seller i has at most ci units of item i, the expected
revenue (19) that seller i can derive at a price pi is at most
pici, even though he or she may receive more demand than
the inventory ci. Therefore, the utility functions in (19) define
a noncooperative game among the sellers in which each seller
wants to set a price for his or her item to maximize the
expected utility.
Unlike the single-buyer Bertrand game (m = 1), which
is a potential game (see Remark 1) and hence admits a
pure Nash equilibrium [32], the above generalized Bertrand
game does not seem to admit a potential function. Therefore,
an immediate question concerning this generalized Bertrand
game is whether it admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
In the following, we will show that under a mild assumption
on the buyers’ evaluations, the generalized Bertrand game
admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium over arbitrary bi-
partite graphs.
Assumption 1: The generalized Bertrand game is called
consistent if sellers’ posted prices can incentivize a buyer
by up to 91% to buy any certain product.
Assumption 1 implies that buyers’ evaluations of product
qualities are consistent and lie within a certain range of each
other. This is a reasonable assumption for several reasons,
particularly in platforms with side information (e.g., Ama-
zon.com) such that buyers have access to product reviews.
This reason is that if a product truly has a certain quality, it
is unlikely that one buyer will evaluate its quality extremely
high while the others evaluate its quality extremely low.
Moreover, buyers are often not fully determined to buy a
product and merely explore the market for suitable alterna-
tives. As a result, sellers’ posted prices cannot incentivize
a buyer 100% to buy a product. For instance, one way to
assure that Assumption 1 holds is to assume that buyers’
evaluations are bounded above by θik ≤ 2.3,∀i, k. In that
case, the demand of buyer k for item i is at most
qik =
exp(θik − pi)
1 +
∑n
j=1 exp(θjk − pj)
≤ exp(θik − pi)
1 + exp(θik − pi)
≤ exp(θik)
1 + exp(θik)
≤ 0.91.
Thus, regardless of posted prices, a buyer will not purchase
an item with a probability of more than 91% from any seller.
Theorem 3: Under market consistency Assumption 1, the
generalized Bertrand game over general bipartite graphs
admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: First, let us assume that the Bertrand game is
captured by a complete bipartite graph, meaning that every
seller i ∈ [n] is visible to every buyer k ∈ [m] with a
quality evaluation θik. We will show that the utility function
of each player i ∈ [n] is quasiconcave with respect to its
own decision variable pi. This quasiconcavity, in view of
[35] and the fact that the utility functions Ui are continuous
and players’ strategy sets are convex and compact, implies
that the generalized Bertrand game admits a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium.4
To establish the quasiconcavity of the utilities, it is enough
to show that ui(pi, p−i) := pi
∑m
k=1 qik is a quasiconcave
function of pi. As pici is a linear (and hence quasiconcave)
function and the pointwise minimum of two functions pre-
serves quasiconcavity [36], we conclude that Ui(pi, p−i) is
also quasiconcave in pi. Therefore, in order to show the
quasiconcavity of ui(pi, p−i) we use the equivalent condition
for differentiable functions [36] to show that for every fixed
p−i, if ∂ui∂pi (pi, p−i) = 0, then
∂2ui
∂p2i
(pi, p−i) < 0. By the
definition of choice probabilities, a calculation shows that
∂qjk
∂pi
=
{
q2ik − qik if j = i,
qikqjk if j 6= i.
4Although the strategy set of a player is [0,∞), it can be shown that
without loss of generality, all the players must choose their prices in the
compact set [0, θ], where θ = maxi,k |θik|.
Therefore,
∂ui
∂pi
=
m∑
k=1
(
qik − pi(qik − q2ik)
)
,
∂2ui
∂p2i
=
m∑
k=1
(q2ik − qik)(2 + 2piqik − pi). (20)
Let pi =
∑m
k=1 qik∑m
k=1(qik−q2ik)
be the solution to ∂ui∂pi = 0. If we
put that relation into (20), and define P =
∑m
`=1 qi`, Q =∑m
`=1 q
2
i`, and R =
∑m
`=1 q
3
i`, we can write
∂2ui
∂p2i
=
m∑
k=1
(q2ik − qik)
(
2 + 2
∑m
`=1 qi`
P −Q qik −
∑m
`=1 qi`
P −Q
)
=
m∑
k=1
qik − q2ik
Q− P
(
2
m∑
`=1
(qi` − q2i`) + 2
m∑
`=1
qi`qik −
m∑
`=1
qi`
)
=
−1
P −Q
m∑
k=1
m∑
`=1
(qik − q2ik)(qi` + 2qi`qik − 2q2i`)
=
−1
P −Q
m∑
k=1
m∑
`=1
qikqi`(1 + qik − 2qi` + 2qikqi` − 2q2ik)
=
−1
P −Q
(
P 2 + PQ− 2PQ+ 2Q2 − 2PR
)
=
−1
P −Q
(
P 2 − PQ+ 2Q2 − 2PR
)
.
(21)
As qi` ∈ (0, 1),∀i, `, we have R < Q < P . Moreover,
by Assumption 1, no player i dominates the market by
taking more than 91% of the demand of any buyer, i.e.,
qi` < 0.91,∀i, `. That implies R ≤ 0.91Q < 2
√
2−1
2 Q. Thus,
P 2−PQ+2Q2−2PR > P 2−PQ+2Q2−(2
√
2−1)PQ
= (P −
√
2Q)2 ≥ 0.
(22)
If we use (22) in (21), it is easy to see that ∂
2ui
∂p2i
< 0, which
shows that ui(pi, p−i) is a quasiconcave function of pi.
Finally, if the market is not captured by a complete
bipartite graph such that seller i is visible only to a subset
Ni ⊂ [m] of buyers, then one can carry over all the above
analysis by replacing the above summations over k ∈ [m]
with the summations over k ∈ Ni (or, alternatively, by
assuming θik → −∞ for every pair of a buyer and seller
(k, i) that are not visible to each other).
Unfortunately, because of a highly nonlinear structure of
the choice probabilities together with the sellers’ capac-
ity constraints, it likely no possible to obtain a closed-
form solution for the equilibrium prices of the generalized
Bertrand game. However, it is known that quasiconcave
games with a unique Nash equilibrium point offer many
nice properties, and that lots of simple iterative learning
and adjustment rules converge to that equilibrium [37], [38].
Finally, we would like to mention that the existence of
capacity constraints can only push the equilibrium prices
higher than they are in the uncapacitated case. The reason is
that given an equilibrium price vector p, if item i does not
have a capacity constraint, then the equilibrium price for that
item is pi =
∑m
k=1 qik∑m
k=1(qik−q2ik)
. On the other hand, if we impose
a capacity of ci on item i, either
∑m
k=1 qik ≤ ci, in which
case the equilibrium price pi remains as in the uncapacitated
case, or
∑m
k=1 qik > ci. In the latter case, seller i can strictly
increase its utility from pici to some (pi+)ci by increasing
its price to match its supply ci with its demand
∑m
k=1 qik.
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Therefore, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1: At any pure Nash equilibrium of the gener-
alized Bertrand game, the total demand received by a seller
i is at most ci, i.e.,
∑m
k=1 qik ≤ ci.
Unfortunately, characterizing the amount of increase of
equilibrium prices caused by capacity constraints is a com-
plicated function of all other parameters, and that makes it
difficult for to obtain a closed-form solution. Therefore, in
the next section, we take a different approach to improving
the revenue obtained at a Nash equilibrium of the general-
ized Bertrand game, by segmenting the market into smaller
submarkets with easily computable equilibrium prices.
A. Optimal Segmentation of the Generalized Bertrand Game
In this section, we consider optimal market segmenta-
tion for the generalized Bertrand game under consistency
Assumption 1 (which guarantees the existence of a pure
Nash equilibrium). In the market-segmenting problem, the
goal is to partition the set of buyers/sellers into smaller
pools {Pr}r∈I in which the sellers in each pool Pr are
visible only to the buyers of the same pool. In particular, we
are interested in a partitioning that achieves the maximum
revenue
∑
r∈I Rev(Pr), where Rev(Pr) denotes the revenue
obtained from the sellers in Pr, given that each pool Pr is
operating at its equilibrium prices and demands. In fact, it has
been shown that in certain markets with simpler exogeneous
supply-demand curves, segmenting the market into smaller
pools can significantly improve the revenue/welfare derived
from those markets [4]. In fact, market segmentation can
be viewed as an extension of the single-assortment problem
to a multi-assortment problem. More precisely, instead of
having the platform to offer only one assortment to all the
buyers, the platform first partitions the buyers into different
clusters based on their preferences and then offers a distinct
assortment to each cluster. Following that idea, we consider
the optimal segmenting problem for the generalized Bertrand
game and provide a simple approximation algorithm for it.
Theorem 4: Under market consistency Assumption 1 and
bounded evaluations θik ∈ [0, θ] ∀i, k, where θ is a constant,
there is an O(logm)-approximation for the optimal segmen-
tation of the generalized Bertrand game.
Proof: Let P be an arbitrary pool in the optimal
segmentation; P contains a subset of sellers NP ⊆ [n] and a
subset of buyers MP ⊆ [m]. Under Assumption 1 and using
Theorem 3, we know that this pool equilibriates at some
prices pi, i ∈ NP and demands qik ∈ [0, 0.91], i ∈ NP , k ∈
5Note that such a matching is possible because qik, k ∈ [m] are
monotonically decreasing and are continuous functions of the price pi.
Fig. 4. An illustration of the network flow in the proof of Theorem 4. The
red and black values next to an edge represent the capacity and the weight
of that edge, respectively. In this figure, m = 5 and n = 3.
MP . Now we consider two cases. If
∑
k∈MP qik < ci, then
at the equilibrium, we have ∂∂pi (pi
∑
k∈MP qik) = 0. Thus,
pi =
∑
k∈MP qik∑
k∈MP (qik − q2ik)
≤
∑
k∈MP qik∑
k∈MP (qik − 0.91qik)
< 12.
If
∑
k∈MP qik ≥ ci, we can write,
1≤ci≤
∑
k∈MP
qik ≤
∑
k∈MP
exp(θik − pi)
1 + exp(θik − pi)≤
m exp(θ − pi)
1 + exp(θ − pi) .
That shows that pi ≤ θ + ln(m − 1). Therefore, in either
case, pi ≤ max{12, θ + ln(m − 1)} = O(lnm). Now we
can upper-bound the revenue of the optimal pool P as∑
i∈NP
pi
( ∑
k∈MP
qik
) ≤ O(lnm) ∑
i∈NP ,k∈MP
qik
≤ O(lnm) ·min{|MP |,
∑
i∈NP
ci},
where the second inequality is by Corollary 1 and the fact
that the total demand is at most |MP | (as each buyer k ∈MP
contributes at most one unit to the overall demand). Finally,
if we sum the above inequality over all optimal pools, the
revenue obtained from optimal segmentation is at most∑
P
O(lnm) min{|MP |,
∑
i∈NP
ci}
≤ O(lnm) min{
∑
P
|MP |,
∑
P
∑
i∈NP
ci}
= O(lnm) min{m,
n∑
i=1
ci}.
Thus, we only need to provide a pool partitioning whose
revenue is within a constant factor of min{m,∑ni=1 ci}.
Consider a directed flow network obtained from the under-
lying bipartite graph of the generalized Bertrand game and
two extra nodes, s and t (see Figure 4). Let s be a source
node connected to each buyer k ∈ [m], where the capacity
of edge (s, k) is 1 and its weight equals to 0. Moreover,
let t be a sink node that is connected to each seller i by a
directed edge (i, t) with capacity ci and weight 0. For every
other connected pair of a buyer and a seller (k, i), we set
the capacity of the directed edge (k, i) to 1 and its weight
to p exp(θik−p)1+exp(θik−p) , where, for the remainder of the proof, we
set p = 1. Let us consider the max-weight flow that sends
min{m,∑ni=1 ci} units of flow from s to t. Since all the
edge capacities are integral, the optimal flow is also integral,
and assigns each buyer to at most one seller. Therefore, the
set of edges that carry positive flow in the optimal flow will
decompose the network into pools Pi, i ∈ N ⊆ [n], where a
pool Pi comprises exactly one seller i and possibly multiple
buyers. In particular, because of the capacity constraints of
the edges (k, t), the number of buyers in Pi is at most ci.
Now suppose that we segment the market into pools
Pi, i ∈ N that are obtained from the above max-flow
solution, and let each one equilibrate at a price pˆi, i ∈ N .
Since pˆi is the equilibrium price for seller i in Pi, the revenue
obtained from Pi at equilibrium price pˆi is no less than the
revenue obtained from Pi at the unit price pi = 1. However,
the revenue at the unit price pi = 1 is exactly the weight
of the max-flow in Pi. As the argument holds for each pool
Pi, i ∈ N , the overall revenue obtained by segmenting the
market into pools Pi, i ∈ N is at least the weight of the
overall max-flow. Finally, note that every edge (k, i) in the
flow network has weight exp(θik−1)1+exp(θik−1) ≥ 11+e . Thus, the
weight of the max-flow is at least min{m,
∑n
i=1 ci}
1+e .
Finally, we note that in the proof of Theorem 4, we
did not use the full power of the max-flow solution. In
other words, we merely used the structure of the optimal
flow to assign buyers to different pools while respecting
capacity constraints. However, a distinguishing feature of
such max-flow partitioning is that its solution incorporates
the relative size of quality evaluations θik into partitioning.
Unfortunately, because of the highly nonlinear structure
of the equilibrium demands and the lack of closed-form
solutions for the equilibrium prices, it is not clear how
to leverage that advantage to obtain a (possibly) constant-
approximation algorithm for the optimal segmentation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered an online assortment problem
under a discriminatory control model wherein the platform
may display only a subset of sellers to an arriving buyer.
That situation induces competition among the sellers such
that the sellers set their prices based on the Nash equilibrium
of a single-buyer Bertrand game. We addressed the problem
of finding a competitive online algorithm under inventory
constraints with an unknown number of buyers and initial
inventories. It is a challenging problem due to the coupling
among the revenue of items, the offered assortments, and
the inventory constraints. However, we showed that a simple
hybrid algorithm achieves a constant competitive ratio and
can be implemented in polynomial time O(nm log n), where
n is the number of items and m is the number of buyers.
We also showed that the online assortment problem with
heterogeneous buyers does not admit a constant competitive
algorithm. To account for heterogeneous buyers, we then
considered an offline setting in which different buyers can
have different evaluations of items’ qualities. We showed that
under a mild consistency assumption, the offline generalized
Bertrand game admits a pure Nash equilibrium, and we
devised a simple O(lnm)-approximation algorithm for its
optimal segmentation.
This work opens several future directions for research. For
instance, it was shown in [3] that in the static setting with
no inventory constraints, the revenue-maximizing assortment
can be found in polynomial time for the single-buyer case.
Based on that finding, what can be said about the standard
greedy algorithm that offers the single-buyer revenue-optimal
assortment to each arriving buyer? More generally, what
about the natural generalization of the inventory-balancing
algorithm given in [13]? As another research direction, one
can consider relaxing the market consistency assumption of
the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in the general-
ized Bertrand game. Moreover, it would be interesting to
see whether the optimal segmentation of the generalized
Bertrand game admits a constant-factor approximation al-
gorithm. Having said that, it may very well be that the
approximation algorithm given here is close to optimal. If it
is, it would be very interesting to establish such a hardness
result.
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